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Analyzing Failure to Accommodate Claims
FAILURE TO ACCOMMODATE, DISCRIMINATORY
INTENT, AND THE MCDONNELL DOUGLAS
FRAMEWORK: DISTINGUISHING THE ANALYSES OF
CLAIMS ARISING UNDER SUBPARTS (A) AND (B) OF
§ 12112(B)(5) OF THE ADA
Aaron Matthew Laing, M.A.
Abstract: The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) creates and protects employment
opportunities for disabled persons by prohibiting adverse employment actions in the form of
disparate treatment and disparate impact. Additionally, subparts (A) and (B) of § 12112(b)(5)
of the ADA place distinct duties on employers to accommodate disabled persons, protecting,
respectively, existing and future employment opportunities. Because the ADA protects both
existing and future opportunities, the duty to accommodate may be breached in two distinct
manners. When a plaintiff alleges failure to accommodate, a court must determine which
section of the ADA applies and select an appropriate analytical framework for the claim. One
commonly used framework is the McDonnell Douglas framework, which was created to
enable Title VII plaintiffs to prove discriminatory intent using indirect, circumstantial
evidence. The McDonnell Douglas framework has been extended to the analysis of
discrimination claims arising under the ADA. While the federal circuit courts of appeals
approve of the use of the McDonnell Douglas framework for ADA disparate treatment claims,
the circuits are split regarding the applicability of the framework to ADA failure to
accommodate claims. This Comment argues that McDonnell Douglas is applicable to failure
to accommodate claims arising under subpart (B) but not to claims arising under subpart (A).
First, there is a critical distinction between the subparts: whereas the proscribed
discrimination under subpart (A) results from a failure to accommodate, the proscribed
discrimination under subpart (B) results in a failure to accommodate. Second, unlike claims
arising under subpart (A), an employer's intent is the central issue in claims arising under
subpart (B). Third, unlike claims arising under subpart (A), claims under subpart (B) are
analogous to disparate treatment claims. By distinguishing between the two types of claims, a
court is able to select an analytical framework consistent with the protection afforded by the
ADA.
Jack, a hearing-impaired web-page designer, works for DotCom, a
large on-line retailer.! Jack's manager often praises his job performance
and has promoted him. Most of DotCom's internal communication
occurs via email, though DotCom also holds meetings. DotCom
distributes the content of the meetings via email and does not base
employment decisions on attendance at meetings. Jack requests that
DotCom provide an American Sign Language interpreter for the
meetings, but DotCom denies his request.
1. Hypothetical created by author.
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Following a recession, DotCom announces possible layoffs. Jack
responds with a company-wide email, deriding his manager and the
layoff policy in profane terms. DotCom terminates Jack for violating
company civility policies. Jack files suit in federal court,2 alleging
discriminatory discharge and failure to accommodate under the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).3
Subparts (A) and (B) of § 12112(b)(5) of the ADA protect the
employment opportunities of disabled persons by placing an affirmative
duty on employers to provide reasonable accommodations.' Subpart (A)
protects present opportunities by requiring employers to provide
accommodations that address existing conditions and limitations,
whereas subpart (B) protects future opportunities by prohibiting
employers from denying future opportunities in order to avoid making
needed accommodations. When an employee such as Jack alleges failure
to accommodate, the court must determine which section of the ADA
applies and select an appropriate analytical framework.7
One commonly used analytical tool is the McDonnell Douglas
framework, which permits an aggrieved employee to prove an
employer's discriminatory intent with indirect, circumstantial evidence.'
While the federal circuits generally agree that McDonnell Douglas is
applicable to ADA disparate treatment claims, such as Jack's
discriminatory discharge claim,9 the federal circuit courts of appeals are
split regarding the applicability of McDonnell Douglas to failure to
2. The first step in filing any claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act is to file a
complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and exhaust all
administrative remedies. See, e.g., Kells v. Sinclair Buick-GMC Truck, Inc., 210 F.3d 827, 836-37
(8th Cir. 2000).
3. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12117 (2001). Plaintiffs often
sue under analogous state anti-discrimination statutes (see, e.g., Washington's Law Against
Discrimination, WASH. REV. CODE. § 49.60 (2001)). Claims brought under these statutes are beyond
the scope of this Comment.
4. Id. § 12112(b)(5)(A)-(B). See, e.g., Muller v. Costello, 187 F.3d 298, 310 (2d Cir. 1999)
(noting failure to accommodate claims arise from language of § 12112(b)(5)(A)-(B) of the ADA).
5. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A).
6. Id. § 12112(b)(5)(B).
7. See Monette v. Electronic Data Sys. Corp., 90 F.3d 1173, 1178 (6th Cir. 1996) (noting that
defining and applying an appropriate framework for disability discrimination claims has been a
difficult task).
8. See Marshall v. Fed. Express Corp., 130 F.3d 1095, 1099 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (citing McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)).
9. See, e.g., Kiel v. Select Artificials, Inc., 169 F.3d 1131, 1134-36 (8th Cir. 1998) (applying
McDonnell Douglas framework in wrongful discharge claim under ADA).
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accommodate claims. 0 The Supreme Court declined to address this issue
during the 2001-2002 term."
The four federal circuits that oppose applying McDonnell Douglas to
failure to accommodate claims rely on the distinction between failure to
accommodate and disparate treatment theories of discrimination." These
circuits reason that because there is no need to prove discriminatory
animus in failure to accommodate claims, such claims are best resolved
with direct, objective evidence of discrimination. 3 As a result, these
circuits decline to apply the McDonnell Douglas framework to failure to
accommodate claims. 4
In contrast, three of the four federal circuits that apply McDonnell
Douglas to failure to accommodate claims often do not distinguish
failure to accommodate from disparate treatment discrimination,
applying the framework to both types of claims." Only the D.C. Circuit
distinguishes disparate treatment from failure to accommodate and
further distinguishes claims arising under subparts (A) and (B), applying
separate analyses to the differing claims. 6 Thus, when a plaintiff alleges
failure to accommodate, nearly two-thirds of the federal circuits either
never apply the McDonnell Douglas framework or always apply it. 7
This Comment argues that federal courts should apply the McDonnell
Douglas framework to failure to accommodate claims arising under
subpart (B) but not to claims arising under subpart (A). Part I discusses
the purpose of the ADA and the types of discrimination it prohibits. Part
10. Four circuits oppose its use. See, e.g., Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d
252,264 (1st Cir. 1999); Monette, 90 F.3d at 1182-83; Hoffman v. Caterpillar Corp., 256 F.3d 568,
572 (7th Cir. 2001); Colo. Cross Disability Coalition v. Hermanson Family Ltd. P'ship 1, 264 F.3d
999, 1006 (10th Cir. 2001). Four circuits approve its use. See, e.g., Hooven-Lewis v. Caldera, 249
F.3d 259, 267-71 (4th Cir. 2001); Taylor v. Principal Fin. Group, 93 F.3d 155, 162-63 (5th Cir.
1996); Allen v. Interior Constr. Servs., 214 F.3d 978, 981 (8th Cir. 2000); Marshall v. Fed. Express
Corp., 130 F.3d 1095, 1099 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
11. Snead v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 237 F.3d 1080, 1097 (9th Cir. 2001) (petitioning Court
to determine whether McDonnell Douglas framework could be applied to failure to accommodate
claims), cert. denied, 122 S. CL 201 (Oct. 4,2001) (No. 01-60).
12. See, e.g., Hoffman, 256 F.3d at 572.
13. See, e.g., Monette, 90 F.3d at 1183.
14. See, e.g., Higgins, 194 F.3d at 264.
15. See, e.g., Allen, 214 F.3d at 981.
16. Marshall v. Fed. Express Corp., 130 F.3d 1095, 1099 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
17. The Second, Third, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have no precedent expressly condoning or
rejecting the application of the McDonnell Douglas framework to failure to accommodate claims
under either section.
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H examines the development, application, and extension of the
McDonnell Douglas framework to ADA claims. Part m discusses the
conflict among the federal circuits regarding the applicability of the
McDonnell Douglas framework to failure to accommodate claims.
Finally, Part IV concludes that because subparts (A) and (B) establish the
duty to accommodate by proscribing distinct employment actions,
federal courts must determine which section of the ADA applies before
selecting an analytical framework. Once a court makes this
determination, it should apply the McDonnell Douglas framework only
to failure to accommodate claims arising under subpart (B) because such
claims require evidence of discriminatory intent and, like disparate
treatment claims, may require indirect, circumstantial evidence to prove
intent.
I. THE ADA AND DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION IN
EMPLOYMENT
Congress passed the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA)
to promote and protect, among other things, equal employment
opportunities for disabled persons. 8 To this end, the ADA prohibits
disability discrimination, including disparate treatment and disparate
impact discrimination.' 9 Section 12112(b)(5) also imposes an affirmative
duty on employers to make reasonable accommodations that enable
disabled persons to pursue, obtain, and enjoy employment
opportunities.20 If this duty is breached, an employer may be liable for
failure to accommodate.2'
18. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a) (2001). The ADA also contains provisions regarding government
services, public accommodations, and housing that are beyond the scope of this Comment.
19. See, e.g., Monette v. Electronic Data Sys. Corp., 90 F.3d 1173, 1179 (6th Cir. 1996)
(discussing types of discrimination prohibited by the ADA).
20. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A)-(B) (2001). See, e.g., Muller v. Costello, 187 F.3d 298, 310 (2d
Cir. 1999) (noting failure to accommodate claims arise from language of § 12112(b)(5)(A)-(B) of
the ADA).
21. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A)-(B) (2001).
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A. The ADA Prohibition Against Disability Discrimination in
Employment
In enacting the ADA, Congress recognized the interest and right of
disabled persons to attain equality of economic opportunity.' Noting that
discrimination is a primary barrier to achieving this interest,' Congress
intended that the ADA enable disabled persons to pursue meaningful
careers commensurate with their abilities by prohibiting disability
discrimination.24 The ADA's general provision prohibiting employment
discrimination provides that:
No covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual
with a disability because of the disability of such individual in
regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or
discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and
other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.'
Consistent with Congress' goal of ending disability discrimination, the
operative phrasing "because of the disability" prohibits adverse
employment actions-that is, decisions that adversely affect employment
opportunities-in the form of both disparate treatment and disparate
impact discrimination.' To be actionable under the ADA, the alleged
discrimination must have some nexus to an adverse employment action.27
Disparate treatment discrimination involves adverse treatment in
which the protected trait-disability status-motivated the employer's
decision to treat the employee adversely.' Often, adverse employment
decisions such as discharge are framed as disparate treatment claims.29
To defend against a disparate treatment claim, an employer must proffer
a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment
action.3"
22. Id. § 12101(a)(8).
23. Id. § 12101(a)(9).
24. Id. § 12101(a)-(b).
25. Id. § 12112(a).
26. See, e.g., Monette v. Electronic Data Sys. Corp., 90 F.3d 1173, 1179 (6th Cir. 1996).
27. Marshall v. Fed. Express Corp., 130 F.3d 1095, 1099 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
28. Id. See also Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 609-10 (1993) (explaining disparate
treatment and disparate impact discrimination).
29. See, e.g., Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252,264 (lst Cir. 1999).
30. See, e.g., Monette, 90 F.3d at 1179.
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In contrast, disparate impact involves facially neutral employment
practices that affect disabled more harshly than non-disabled employees
and cannot be justified by business necessity.3' Examples of disparate
impact discrimination include ostensibly neutral standards such as
physical exams that disparately impact disabled persons.32 To defend
against a disparate impact claim, an employer must show that the
challenged standard or requirement exists out of business necessity.33
Business necessity may be shown with objective evidence that
establishes a relationship between the standard and essential functions of
the job, including written job descriptions, the amount of time
performing certain tasks, and the consequences of not performing certain
tasks.34 If the employer meets this burden, the employer may also have to
show that the standard could not be achieved by reasonably
accommodating a disabled person as an employee.35 The principal
difference between disparate treatment and disparate impact claims is
that the former require proof of the employer's intent.36
B. The Duty to Provide Reasonable Accommodation Under the ADA
Congress also recognized that modifications of the work environment
would play an integral role in the process of economically enfranchising
disabled persons.37 The ADA further protects the employment interests
of disabled persons by placing an affirmative duty on employers to
provide "reasonable accommodations" to the known limitations of an
otherwise qualified disabled employee.38
A reasonable accommodation is properly understood as a means to an
end.39 Such ends include enabling disabled persons to be considered for
employment opportunities,4" to perform essential job functions once
31. Hazen Paper Co., 506 U.S. at 609.
32. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112(b)(3), (6) (2001). See, e.g., Monette, 90 F.3d at 1179.
33. Id. §§ 12112(b)(3), (6). See, e.g., Monetre, 90 F.3d at 1179.
34. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.3(n)(3) (2001).
35. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(5)(A) (2001). See infra Part I B-C.
36. Hazen Paper Co., 507 U.S. at 609 (quoting Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S.
324, 335-36 n.15 (1977)).
37. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (a)(5)-(6) (2001).
38. Id. § 12112(b)(5).
39. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.3(o)(1) (2001).
40. Id. §1630.3(o)(1)(i).
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employed,4' and to enjoy the benefits and privileges of employment
enjoyed by other non-disabled employees.42 For example, an employer
may be required to provide a sign-language interpreter to accommodate a
hearing-impaired employee's limitations.' 3
The ADA requires an employer to accommodate disability-related
limitations that the employer knows about, and the employee bears the
initial duty to inform the employer of such limitations.' Knowledge of
an employee's disability does not in itself create a duty to accommodate
because not all disabilities create limitations that affect an employee's
ability to perform essential job functions.45 It is the limitations, not the
disability, that require accommodations.
4 6
Once the employee informs the employer of such limitations, the
employee and employer may work together in an interactive process to
determine an appropriate accommodation.47 This process helps determine
the precise limitations resulting from the disability and potential
reasonable accommodations that could overcome those limitations.4"
Although there is no express duty to engage in the interactive process,49
failure to do so may inhibit an employer and employee's ability to find
an appropriate reasonable accommodation."
To be reasonable, an accommodation must be both cost-efficient and
efficacious.5' Accommodations that fail to address a disabled employee's
limitations are not, by definition, reasonable.5 2 However, while the ADA
requires that conditions be adequate so that all employees can
satisfactorily and comfortably perform the essential functions of their
jobs, 3 the ADA does not require employers to expend even slight sums
to create an identity between the working conditions of disabled and
41. Id. §1630.3(o)(1)(ii).
42. Id. §1630.3(o)(1)(ii).
43. Id. § 1630.3(o)(2)(ii).
44. Beck v. Wis. Bd. of Regents, 75 F.3d 1130, 1135 (7th Cir. 1996).
45. Taylor v. Principal Fin. Group, Inc., 93 F.3d 155, 162-63 (5th Cir. 1996).
46. Id. at 164.
47. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3) (2001).
48. Id. See, e.g., Beck, 75 F.3d at 1135.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Vande Zande v. Wis. Dep't of Admin., 44 F.3d 538,542-43 (7th Cir. 1995).
52. Id. at 542.
53. Id. See also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.3(n) (2001) (defining what constitutes essential job function and
related evidence).
919
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nondisabled applicants and employees. 4 Therefore, disabled persons are
not entitled to accommodations that enable them to perform any non-
essential job functions of their choosing, 55 nor are they entitled to their
preferred accommodation if the employer provides an alternative means
of reasonably accommodating the person's disability. 6
C. Breaching the Duty: Failure to Accommodate Claims
Subparts (A) and (B) of § 12112(b)(5) of the ADA protect,
respectively, both the existing and future employment opportunities of
disabled persons by prohibiting two distinct ways that employers might
breach the duty to accommodate." Subpart (A) creates a duty to
accommodate limitations associated with an existing employment
opportunity," holding an employer strictly liable for knowingly failing to
accommodate a disabled employee's limitations unless accommodation
would impose an undue hardship.5 9 Under this section, a disabled person
may sue for any failure to accommodate that results in an adverse
employment action or condition? °
In contrast, subpart (B) creates a duty on employers to accommodate
limitations that may arise from the conditions of a future opportunity and
imposes liability on employers who deny future employment
opportunities based on the need to make a reasonable accommodation.6'
Under this section, a disabled person may sue an employer any time the
employer denies an employment opportunity that obviates its duty to
accommodate.6' Claims for failure to accommodate may arise under
either section. 3
54. Vande Zande, 44 F.3d at 546.
55. Hoffman v. Caterpillar, Inc., 256 F.3d 568, 577 (7th Cir. 2001).
56. Vande Zande, 44 F.3d at 546.
57. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A)-(B) (2001). See Marshall v. Fed. Express Corp., 130 F.3d 1095,
1099 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (distinguishing duty to accommodate and claims under subparts (A) and (B)
of §12112(b)(5)).
58. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A). See Marshall, 130 F.3d at 1099.
59. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A).
60. See Marshall, 130 F.3d at 1099.
61. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(B) (2001). See Marshall, 130 F.3d at 1099.
62. See Marshall, 130 F.3d at 1099.
63. See, e.g., Muller v. Costello, 187 F.3d 298, 310 (2d Cir. 1999).
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1. Failure to Accommodate Under § 12112(b)(5)(A) of the ADA:
Strict Liability
Subpart (A) prohibits employers from "not making reasonable
accommodations to the known ... limitations of an otherwise qualified
individual with a disability who is an applicant or employee, unless [the
employer] can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an
undue hardship on the operation of the business."' This subpart places a
duty on employers to make accommodations to the limitations associated
with the conditions of an existing employment opportunity and imposes
strict liability on employers who knowingly fail to accommodate
disabled employees' limitations unless accommodation would impose an
undue hardship on the employer. 6 The employer's intent is not an issue
under subpart (A) because any failure to accommodate is necessarily
because of the employee's disability-without the disability, there is no
need for an accommodation.67 The central issues in a failure to
accommodate claim are whether a reasonable accommodation was
available and whether the accommodation would pose an undue
hardship. 6
8
To establish a prima facie case of failure to accommodate under
subpart (A), a plaintiff must show that he or she is a qualified individual
with a disability within the meaning of the ADA; that the employer,
despite knowledge of the disability, did not reasonably accommodate its
limitations; and that the employer's failure to accommodate adversely
affected the terms, conditions, or privileges of the plaintiffs
employment. 69 The employee also carries the burden of proving that the
requested accommodation was reasonable.70
With regard to the third element of the prima facie case, any adverse
employment decision that stems from the lack of accommodation may be
actionable under. subpart (A), including difficult work conditions, denial
64. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2001).
65. Id. See Marshall, 130 F.3d at 1099.
66. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2001).
67. See, e.g., Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252,264 (Ist Cir. 1999).
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Vande Zande v. Wis. Dep't of Admin., 44 F.3d 538,543 (7th Cir. 1995) (stating "reasonable"
means both "efficacious" and "proportioned to costs"). See Gaines v. Runyon, 107 F.3d 1171, 1175
(6th Cir. 1997) (requiring accommodation be both reasonable and necessary). But cf. Higgins, 194
F.3d at 264 (suggesting plaintiff need not prove efficacy).
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of promotions, and discharge.7 For example, a disabled employee who is
fired for not meeting productivity requirements may challenge her
discharge on the grounds that it resulted from a failure to accommodate
her known limitations. 2 Thus, to establish the prima facie case, a
plaintiff must show that adverse effect resulted from the denial of a
reasonable accommodation.73
Once the plaintiff establishes the prima facie case, the employer must
show that the accommodation would pose an "undue hardship" to the
business.74 The basic inquiries in a failure to accommodate claim are
whether a reasonable accommodation was available and whether the
accommodation would pose an undue hardship.' The resulting inquiry is
primarily a cost-benefit analysis.76  If the burden posed by
accommodation would outweigh its benefit, then the accommodation
poses an undue hardship.'
For example, a hearing-impaired employee may request a sign-
language interpreter. The employer may deny the request on the grounds
that it is too costly or that it is unnecessary for the employee to fulfill
essential job functions. Although accommodations are generally viewed
in terms of the financial burden they impose, courts consider other
factors such as the type, location, size of the employer, and the nature of
the accommodation.78 Following the example, the court may examine the
cost of the interpreter, the essential functions of the employee's job, the
employer's resources, and the benefit to the employee. If an employer
can demonstrate that accommodation would impose an undue hardship
on the operation of the business, then it has not breached its duty to
accommodate.79
71. See Marshall v. Federal Express Corp., 130 F.3d 1095, 1099 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Vande Zande, 44 F.3d at 542.
75. See, e.g., Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 264 (1st Cir. 1999).
76. Vande Zande, 44 F.3d at 542-43.
77. Higgins, 194 F.3d at 264.
78. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(B) (2001).
79. Vande Zande, 44 F.3d at 543.
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2. Failure to Accommodate Under § 12112(b)(5)(B) of the ADA:
Intent-based Liability
In contrast, subpart (B) places a duty on employers to accommodate
limitations related to conditions of future employment opportunities."
Subpart (B) prohibits employers from "denying employment
opportunities to a job applicant or employee who is an otherwise
qualified individual with a disability, if such denial is based on the need
of [the employer] to make reasonable accommodation" to the limitations
of the employee or applicant."' Failure to accommodate under subpart
(B) involves two elements: the denial of an employment opportunity and
the need for an accommodation, contingent upon the granting of the
opportunity.82 Because the reason for the denial is at issue, the
employer's intent is the threshold issue under this section."
Subpart (B) requires employers to consider disabled persons for
employment opportunities, although affording such opportunities might
require the employer to provide reasonable accommodation.' For
example, an employer may not refuse opportunities such as hiring,
promotion, training, or improved working conditions in order to avoid
making reasonable accommodations that might accompany the
opportunity. 5 Thus, once an employment opportunity arises, an
employer may not deny it to avoid its duty to accommodate. 6
To establish a prima facie case under subpart 03), an employee must
show that he or she is a qualified individual with a disability within the
meaning of the ADA; that he or she works for an employer covered by
the ADA; that the employer had knowledge of the limitations requiring
reasonable accommodations; and that the employee suffered an adverse
employment action-the denial of an employment opportunity.87
80. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(B) (2001). See Marshall v. Fed. Express Corp., 130 F.3d 1095, 1099
(D.C. Cir. 1997).
81. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(B).
82. See Marshall, 130 F.3d at 1099.
83. See Tyndall v. Nat'l Educ. Ctrs., Inc. of Cal., 31 F.3d 209, 214-15 (4th Cir. 1994) (noting
employer's knowledge of disability gives strong inference about intent); Zamudio v. Patla, 956 F.
Supp. 803, 813 (N.D. Ill. 1997).
84. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(B). See Marshall, 130 F.3d at 1099.
85. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(B). See Marshall, 130 F.3d at 1099.
86. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(B). See Marshall, 130 F.3d at 1099.
87. See Hamman v. DHL Airways, 165 F.3d 441,449-50 (6th Cir. 1999); Zamudio, 956 F. Supp.
at 813.
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Because the need for accommodation is contingent upon a grant of the
opportunity, the nexus between the adverse employment action and the
failure to accommodate is clear-the former will always precede the
latter.
For example, an employer may decide not to hire a hearing-impaired
employee because the employer knows that it will have to provide the
employee a sign-language interpreter. The employee is denied the job
and, consequently, the employer evades its duty to accommodate.
However, unlike claims arising under subpart (A), the focus of subpart
(B) claims is the employer's reason for the denial.88 An employer may
have other legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for denying a disabled
employee an opportunity, thereby denying the accommodation.89
For instance, an employer may deny a promotion because another
more qualified applicant applied for the same position.90 Also, like
claims arising under subpart (A), employers are not liable under subpart
(B) for denying employment opportunities that would necessitate
accommodation if the accommodation would impose an undue
hardship.9' Thus, an employer is not liable under subpart (B) if
accommodation would pose an undue hardship92 or if the employer has
another legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for denying an
employment opportunity.93
II. THE MCDONNELL DOUGLAS FRAMEWORK
In the years following the passage of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 (Title VII), 94 plaintiffs bringing discrimination suits faced
difficulty in proving the subjective intent of their employers.95 The
Supreme Court recognized this difficulty and created the McDonnell
Douglas burden-shifting framework.96 The framework permits plaintiff
employees to prove discriminatory intent through indirect, circumstantial
88. See Marshall, 130 F.3d at 1099-1100.
89. Id.
90. Tyndall v. Nat'l Educ. Ctrs., Inc. of Cal., 31 F.3d 209, 214-15 (4th Cir. 1994).
91. See, e.g., Muller v. Costello, 187 F.3d 298, 310 (2d Cir. 1999).
92. Id.
93. See, e.g., Marshall, 130 F.3d at 1100 (employer gave fiscal reason for denial).
94. Civil Rights Act of 1964 Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (2001).
95. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-05 (1973).
96. Id.
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evidence when no direct evidence of discrimination is available.97 From
its inception, the Supreme Court intended that the framework be
adaptable to the varying elements of discrimination claims.9" Federal
courts have taken advantage of the framework's adaptability, extending
its use to the analysis of claims brought under the ADA.99
A. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green
Title VII made it unlawful for an employer to discriminate in hiring
and terms of employment because of a person's race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin.100 However, federal courts interpreting Title VII
lacked "harmony" in their application of its protections, so the Supreme
Court granted certiorari to McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green"1 in order
to clarify the standards for analyzing employment discrimination
claims."02 Specifically, the Supreme Court addressed the issues of the
proper order and substantive nature of evidence required to prove
discriminatory animus in actions brought under Title VII. 0 3
In McDonnell Douglas, the defendant refused to rehire a black
mechanic after he participated in an illegal demonstration that disrupted
business." 4 The Supreme Court held that the district court erred by not
permitting the plaintiff to offer evidence at trial showing that the
employer's proffered reason for its refusal to rehire was a pretext-or
subterfuge-for racial discrimination." 5 The Court reasoned that
discriminatory animus could be inferred if the employer rehired white
employees who engaged in the illegal protest or, even less directly,
through evidence that indicated that the employer was hostile to civil
rights activities.0 6 The Court concluded that the fact that an employer is
able to adduce a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason-here, employee
97. Id.
98. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802 n.13.
99. See, e.g., Halperin v. Abacus Tech. Corp., 128 F.3d 191, 196-97 (4th Cir. 1997).
100. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (2001).
101. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
102. Id. at798.
103. Id. at 793-94.
104. Id. at 796-97.
105. Id. at 807.
106. Id. at 804-05.
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misconduct-for an adverse employment action is not dispositive of a
Title VII claim if the reason is shown to be pretext for discrimination."°7
B. The McDonnell Douglas Evidentiary Framework: Shifting Burdens
of Production and Persuasion and their Effects
The McDonnell Douglas framework consists of a three-step process
designed to address the issue of an employer's discriminatory intent.'
The difficulty of proving intent stems from the fact that unless an
employer admits to having discriminatory motives, there will be no
direct evidence of illegal motive for an adverse employment action.
Therefore, the Supreme Court established the framework to permit
plaintiffs to prove discriminatory intent with indirect, circumstantial
evidence, particularly evidence of pretext.0 9
The McDonnell Douglas Court created a burden-shifting framework
to address the lack of direct evidence of discriminatory intent."0 The
framework consists of three flexible but distinct steps."' First, a plaintiff
must establish, by a preponderance of the evidence,"' the basic elements
of a prima facie case of discrimination: that he or she is a member of a
protected class; that he or she is qualified for the job; and that he or she
suffered an adverse employment action.' The Supreme Court observed
that the plaintiff's burden of establishing a prima facie case of
discrimination is "not onerous;" however, the prima facie case served a
crucial function in litigation by eliminating common nondiscriminatory
reasons for the defendant's actions." 4 Moreover, the prima facie case
raises the presumption that, more likely than not, the employer
discriminated against the employee." 5 Under the McDonnell Douglas
analysis, a plaintiffs failure to establish a prima facie case entities a
defendant to judgment as a matter of law. 116
107. Id. at 804.
108. Id. at 802.
109. Id. at 804-05.
110. Id. at 802.
111. Id. at 802 n.13 (explaining that because facts will vary in Title VII cases, elements of prima
facie case will vary).
112. Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,252-53 (1981).
113. See id.
114. Id. at 253-54.
115. Id. at 254.
116. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., 530 U.S. 133, 140 (2000).
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Second, the burden then shifts to the defendant employer, who must
offer a legitimate, nondiscriminatory explanation for its action. 17 If the
defendant proffers a legitimate reason, the presumption of discrimination
simply "drops from the case." ' The defendant need not persuade the
court that it did not discriminate; the second step shifts the burden of
production, not the burden of persuasion." 9 The ultimate burden of
persuading the court that the employer discriminated remains at all times
on the plaintiff."2 Nevertheless, a defendant's failure to offer a legitimate
reason for the adverse employment action entities the plaintiff to
judgment as a matter of law.'
Third, if the employer proffers a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason
for its actions, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reason offered by the
defendant was pretext for discrinination.1 The purpose of the third step
is to afford the plaintiff a chance to demonstrate that the employer's
presumptively valid reasons for the adverse employment action were in
fact a cover-up for discrimination." It is possible to infer pretext from a
variety of types of indirect evidence, including general disparate
treatment of employees from protected groups. 24 For example, a black
plaintiff that was refused re-employment for participating in a strike
might show that his or her former employer rehired white employees that
participated in the strike."as
However, evidence of pretext does not mandate a finding for the
plaintiff," though a plaintiff's failure to establish evidence of pretext
entitles a defendant to judgment as a matter of law.127 The Supreme
Court is aware that in some situations, despite evidence of both a prima
facie case and pretext, no rational factfmder could conclude that the
117. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253.
118. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502,507 (1993).
119. Id.
120. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253.
121. Id. at 254 (stating that if the employer "is silent in the face of the presumption," judgment
must be entered for the plaintiff).
122- Id. at 253.
123. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 805 (1973).
124. Id. at 804-05.
125. Id. at 804.
126. See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 524 (1993) (explaining that proof of
pretext is not, in itself, proof of discrimination).
127. See, e.g., Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., 530 U.S. 133, 140 (2000).
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employer's action was discriminatory. 128 Thus, courts must consider
factors such as the strength of the plaintiff's prima facie case, the
probative value of evidence of pretext, and other evidence that supports
the employee's case. 1
29
C. The Adaptability of the McDonnell Douglas Framework: Extending
its Utility to ADA Claims
The Supreme Court intended that the McDonnell Douglas framework
be adaptable to the varying elements of the prima facie case of
discrimination.1 30 Noting the flexibility of the framework1 3' as well as the
difficulty of directly proving discriminatory intent in disability
discrimination suits,"2 federal courts have adopted the McDonnell
Douglas framework for the analysis of discrimination claims under the
ADA. 133 Courts using the McDonnell Douglas framework recognize that
it is not to be rigidly applied; it is simply a means of fine-tuning the
presentation of proof in order to focus on the ultimate issue of whether
the employee demonstrated that the employer intentionally
discriminated. 134
To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA, a
plaintiff must show that he or she has a qualifying disability; is qualified
for the job, with or without a reasonable accommodation; and that he or
she suffered an adverse employment action because of the disability.1
35
Once the prima facie case has been established, the burden shifts to the
128. See e.g., id. at 148.
129. Id. at 148-49.
130. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802 n.13.
131. See, e.g., Halperin v. Abacus Tech. Corp., 128 F.3d 191, 196 n.6 (4th Cir. 1997) (noting
framework should not be rigidly applied).
132. See, e.g., United States Postal Servs. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 716 (1983)
(stating that direct testimony as to employer's mental processes is rare).
133. Congress intended that the same legal standards that apply to Rehabilitation Act claims be
applied to ADA claims. See, e.g., Wong v. Regents of Univ. of Calif., 192 F.3d 807, 816 (9th Cir.
1999) (applying same legal standards to ADA claims as found in Rehabilitation Act precedent).
Because the Supreme Court applied McDonnell Douglas to a Rehabilitation Act claim in School Bit
of Nassau County, Florida v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 276 (1987), it is generally accepted that the
framework is applicable to ADA claims. See, e.g., Wong, 192 F.3d at 816.
134. Halperin, 128 F.3d. at 196 n.6.
135. Id. at 197 (explaining prima facie case of disparate treatment under the ADA). For analytical
clarity, this Comment does not address mixed motive cases in which the plaintiff's disability status
was one among many factors that influenced the employer's decision.
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employer to proffer a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the
adverse employment decision.36 If the employer proffers a legitimate
reason for its action, then the burden shifts back to the employee to
present evidence that the employer's reason is pretextual' 37 Evidence of
pretext may include an employer's refusal to engage in the interactive
process to find an accommodation,3 3 repeated denials of
accommodations' 39 and discriminatory remarks aimed at disabled
employees. 4
III. THE MCDONNELL DOUGLAS FRAMEWORK AND FAILURE
TO ACCOMMODATE CLAIMS: CONFLICTING ANALYSES
FROM THE FEDERAL CIRCUITS
While all of the federal circuits recognize failure to accommodate
claims arising under subparts (A) and (B) of § 12112(b)(5) of the
ADA,'41 the federal circuits are divided in their approach to such
claims. 42 Specifically, the circuits are split regarding the applicability of
the McDonnell Douglas framework to failure to accommodate claims
arising under the respective subparts. The resulting precedent can be
broken down into four types, according to whether the circuit applies the
McDonnell Douglas framework to claims arising, respectively, under
subparts (A) and (3) of the ADA.
A. Circuits Applying McDonnell Douglas to Claims Arising Under 42
U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A)
Federal appelate courts in the Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth circuits apply
the McDonnell Douglas framework to failure to accommodate claims
136. See, e.g., Marshall v. Fed. Express Corp., 130 F.3d 1095, 1100 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
137. Id.
138. See, e.g., Walstead v. Woodbury County, Iowa, 113 F. Supp. 2d 1318, 1342 (N.D. Iowa
2000).
139. See, e.g., Kells v. Sinclair Buick-GMC Truck, Inc., 210 F.3d 827, 833-34 (8th Cir. 2000).
140. Id.
141. See supra sections ILB-C.
142. It should be noted that the Second, Third, Ninth, and Eleventh circuits have not expressly
addressed this issue. See supra notel7.
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arising under subpart (A). 143 In selecting an analytical framework for
ADA cases, these circuits do not distinguish disparate treatment claims
from failure to accommodate claims.'" Rather, these circuits permit the
plaintiff to proceed either with direct or indirect evidence of
discrimination. 45
For example, in Mole v. Buckhorn Rubber Products146 the plaintiff
Mole worked in customer service for Buckhorn until her multiple
sclerosis (MS) began to detract from her job performance. 47 Mole's
supervisor conducted several performance reviews, eventually warning
her that she must improve or be terminated. 48 Mole's MS worsened, and
she took a series of medical leaves. 149 Mole returned to work but failed
another performance review, so her supervisor notified her that she
would be terminated.150 On her last day, Mole requested that she would
be allowed to continue working under various accommodated conditions,
but Buckhorn ignored the request and declined to reinstate her.' 5'
Mole filed suit, alleging failure to accommodate under
§ 12112(b)(5)(A) of the ADA. 52 The district court applied the
McDonnell Douglas framework and held that Mole failed to establish a
prima facie case of disability discrimination; thus the court granted
Buckhom summary judgment.'53 The district court reasoned that even if
Mole had established a prima facie case, she failed to offer evidence of
pretext to rebut Buckhorn's legitimate reason for its decision to
terminate, her poor job performance.'54 The Eight Circuit affirmed on the
143. See, e.g., Hooven-Lewis v. Caldera, 249 F.3d 259, 268-71 (4th Cir. 2001); Allen v. Rapides
Parish Sch. Bd., 204 F.3d 619, 623 n.3 (5th Cir. 2000); Allen v. Interior Constr. Servs., 214 F.3d
978, 981 (8th Cir. 2000).
144. See, e.g., Hooven-Lewis, 249 F.3d at 268-71; Allen, 204 F.3d at 623 n.3; Allen, 214 F.3d at
981.
145. See, e.g., Hooven-Lewis, 249 F.3d at 268-71; Allen, 204 F.3d at 623 n.3; Allen, 214 F.3d at
981.
146. 165 F.3d 1212 (8th Cir. 1999).
147. Id. at 1215-16.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 1216.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 1214.
154. Id.
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same grounds, noting that Mole's poor job performance had begun over a
year before she was aware that she had MS. 5-
The Eighth Circuit's approach has met with some internal criticism.
15 6
In a dissenting opinion in Mole, Judge Lay criticized both the trial court
and appellate court for applying McDonnell Douglas to Mole's failure to
accommodate claim.'57 He noted that McDonnell Douglas should only
apply to disparate treatment claims, not claims arising under
§12112(b)(5).' Judge Lay further noted that the central question in a
failure to accommodate claim is whether the employer should have
accommodated the employee but did not.59 His dissent also criticized the
majority for being misled by the plaintiffs misapplication of legal
principles in bringing the claim under McDonnell Douglas.I"e Finally,
Judge Lay concluded that a triable issue remained regarding Mole's
claims because Buckhom was aware of Mole's MS, its effects on her
performance, and potential accommodations before it decided to
terminate her; thus the issue was whether Buckhom had fulfilled its duty
under the ADA.1
6
'
B. Circuits Not Applying McDonnell Douglas to Claims Arising Under
42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A)
In contrast, the First, Sixth, Seventh, and Tenth circuits have adopted
a position similar to Judge Lay's and have expressly rejected the use of
the McDonnell Douglas framework for ADA failure to accommodate
claims. 62 These circuits distinguish failure to accommodate claims from
disparate treatment claims, noting that the former are best resolved with
155. Id. at 1218-19.
156. Id. at 1219 (Lay, J., dissenting). See also Montgomery v. John Deere & Co., 169 F.3d 556,
562 (8th Cir. 1999) (Lay, J., concurring, but criticizing use of McDonnell Douglas); WaIstead v.
Woodbury County, 113 F. Supp. 2d 1318, 1326 n.3 (N.D. Iowa 2000) (expressing misgivings about
precedent using McDonnell Douglas in failure to accommodate claims).
157. Mole, 165 F.3d at 1219 (Lay, J., dissenting).
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 1220 n.4.
161. See id. at 1221.
162. See, e.g., Colo. Cross Disability Coalition v. Hermanson Family Ltd. P'ship I, 264 F.3d 999,
1006 n.9 (10th Cir. 2001); Reed v. LePage Bakeries, Inc., 244 F.3d 254, 259 n.3 (1st Cir. 2001);
Monette v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 90 F.3d 1173, 1183 (6th Cir. 1996); Hoffman v. Caterpillar, Inc.,
256 F.3d 568, 573 (7th Cir. 2001) (citing Bultemeyer v. Fort Wayne Cmty. Sch., 100 F.3d 1281,
1283 (7th Cir. 1996)).
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direct, objective evidence. 63 Thus, none of these circuits applies
McDonnell Douglas to claims arising under subpart (A).
For instance, in Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,16 the
plaintiff Higgins, a hearing-impaired factory worker, complained that
sweat-inducing steam and noise from a loudspeaker were interfering with
his hearing aid and making it difficult for him to work. 65 He requested
that a fan be installed and that the loudspeaker be moved, but New
Balance denied these requests. 6 6 Following a series of warnings for
confrontations with co-workers, New Balance terminated Higgins for
insubordination. 67
Higgins filed suit, alleging wrongful discharge and failure to
accommodate under subpart (A).168 The district court applied McDonnell
Douglas to both claims and, finding no evidence of discriminatory
animus, granted New Balance summary judgment on both claims. 69 On
appeal, Higgins reasserted his failure to accommodate claim.7 °
The First Circuit distinguished Higgins' failure to accommodate claim
from the other enumerated types of discrimination under the ADA,
stating that failure to accommodate claims do not require that the
plaintiff show that the employer's action was motivated by
discriminatory intent.17' The court reasoned that any failure to
accommodate is necessarily due to the presence of the disability because
without the disability, no accommodation is necessary. 172 The court
further reasoned that any failure to accommodate violates the ADA
regardless of the employer's intent, unless the proposed accommodation
would create an undue hardship. 73 The First Circuit concluded that it
was inappropriate to apply McDonnell Douglas to Higgins's failure to
163. See, e.g., Colo. Cross, 264 F.3d at 1006 n.9; Reed, 244 F.3d at 259 n.3; Monette, 90 F.3d at
1183; Hoffman, 256 F.3d at 573.
164. 194 F.3d 252 (1st Cir. 1999).
165. Id. at 257-58.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 257.
168. See id. at 256, 264.
169. Id. at 263.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 263-64.
173. ld.
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accommodate claim because no evidence of intent is needed for such
claims.' 7
4
The First Circuit explained that to survive a motion for summary
judgment on a failure to accommodate claim, a plaintiff must establish a
prima facie case of discrimination. 75 The court noted that Higgins had a
hearing impairment, that New Balance knew of the impairment, and that
management failed to supply a fan or move the loudspeaker.76
Therefore, the First Circuit vacated and remanded the district court's
grant of summary judgment for New Balance on Higgins' subpart (A)
failure to accommodate claim 77
Like the First Circuit, the Sixth, Seventh, and Tenth circuits also reject
the application of McDonnell Douglas to subpart (A) failure to
accommodate claims. The Sixth Circuit has noted that failure to
accommodate claims hinge upon two issues-whether the requested
accommodation is reasonable, and whether it would impose an undue
hardship-both of which are best resolved through direct, objective
evidence. 7 The Seventh Circuit has held repeatedly that the McDonnell
Douglas framework is inappropriate for failure to accommodate claims
because they are not disparate treatment claiMs. 179 Finally, the Tenth
Circuit has adopted the First Circuit's reasoning and also has rejected the
application of McDonnell Douglas to ADA failure to accommodate
claims. 80
C. Circuits Applying McDonnell Douglas to Claims Arising Under 42
U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(B)
While the D.C. Circuit is the only circuit to explicitly apply the
McDonnell Douglas framework to claims under subpart (B),'
presumably the Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth circuits, due to their liberal
application of the framework, would also apply the analysis to such
174. Id. at 264-65.
175. Id. See also supra note 69 and accompanying text for the elements of a prima facie case.
176. Id. at 265.
177. Id.
178. Monette v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 90 F.3d 1173, 1183 (6th Cir. 1996).
179. See, e.g., Hoffman v. Caterpillar, Inc., 256 F.3d 568,573 (7th Cir. 2001).
180. Colo. Cross Disability Coalition v. Hermanson Family Ltd. P'ship 1, 264 F.3d 999, 1006 n. 9
(10th Cir. 2001).
181. See, e.g., Marshall v. Fed. Express, Corp., 130 F.3d 1095, 1099 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
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claims. 82 The Sixth Circuit may also apply the framework, though its
apposite precedent is unclear.'83 Only the D.C. Circuit both distinguishes
disparate treatment claims from failure to accommodate claims as well as
subpart (A) claims from subpart (B) claims, applying McDonnell
Douglas only to claims arising under subpart (B).'84
For example, in Marshall v. Federal Express Corp.,'85 the plaintiff
Marshall worked as a customer service agent for Federal Express.'86
Marshall suffered an injury while on duty, making it difficult for her to
meet the lifting requirements of her job. Marshall entered a temporary
light-duty work program to recover from her injury.'88 Marshall did not
recover, so Federal Express hired someone else to fill her position and
gave her a ninety day grace-period to find another job within the
company.'89 A co-worker suggested she apply for an operations agent job
at another Federal Express facility, but the same co-worker then
erroneously told her that she could not work there because Marshall's
husband worked there. 90 By the time Marshall discovered the mistake,
the position had been retracted.' 9' Unable to find another job within the
company, Marshall was fired seventy-five days after the grace period
ended. 19
2
Marshall filed suit in federal court, alleging that Federal Express
failed to accommodate her by refusing to grant her the operations agent
182. See, e.g., Tyndall v. Nat'l Educ. Ctr., Inc. of Cal., 31 F.3d 209, 214-15 (4th Cir. 1994)
(noting that strong presumption of non-discriminatory motive imputed when same person hires and
fires in 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(B) claim); see also Allen v. Interior Constr. Servs., 214 F.3d 978,
981 (8th Cir. 2000) (applying McDonnell Douglas to claim characterized as a 42 U.S.C.
§ 12112(b)(5)(A) claim where plaintiff alleged that employer attempted to avoid duty to
accommodate by refusing to rehire him). But see Lovejoy-Wilson v. NOCO Motor Fuel, Inc., 263
F.3d 208, 216-22 (2d Cir. 2001) (characterizing allegation of failure to promote to avoid making
accommodation as 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) claim and not applying McDonnell Douglas).
183. Hariman v. DHL Airways, 165 F.3d 441, 449 (6th Cir. 1999) (addressing 42 U.S.C.
§ 12112(b)(5)(B) claim by citing portion of Monette, 90 F.3d at 1185, referring to instances in which
McDonnell Douglas applies).
184. Marshall, 130 F.3d at 1099.
185. 130 F.3d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
186. Id. at 1096.
187. Id. at 1097.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 1097-98.
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position at the other facility.1 93 The district court granted Federal Express
summary judgment on this claim, noting both that Federal Express
offered a legitimate reason for its actions and that Marshall offered no
evidence that the reason was pretextual. 1
94
The D.C. Circuit determined that the only adverse employment action
presented in the claim was the denial of the opportunity to apply for the
operations agent position. 5 It distinguished Marshall's subpart (3)
failure to accommodate claim from wrongful termination and stated that
the McDonnell Douglas framework was the appropriate analytical tool
for Marshall's claim. 196 The court noted that Federal Express had given a
legitimate reason for its decision to deny Marshall the operations
position: the position was eliminated following a staffing analysis. 7
Marshall did not present any evidence that this reason was pretext for
discriminatory motive; thus the appellate court affirmed the district
court's grant of summary judgment.'98
D. Circuits Not Applying McDonnell Douglas to Claims Arising Under
42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(B)
Finally, the Seventh Circuit expressly rejects the application of the
McDonnell Douglas framework to failure to accommodate claims arising
under subpart (B), stating that the framework applies only to disparate
treatment claims.' 99 The First, Sixth, and Tenth circuits may also reject
the use of the framework for subpart 03) failure to accommodate claims,
depending upon how broadly one interprets their precedent.2"' However,
unlike these circuits, the Seventh Circuit distinguishes failure to
193. See id. at 1099.
194. Id. at 1097, 1099.
195. Id. at 1099.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 1100.
198. Id.
199. See, e.g., Hoffman v. Caterpillar, Inc., 256 F.3d 568,573 (7th Cir. 2001).
200. See, e.g., Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 264 n.5 (1st Cir. 1999)
(distinguishing claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112(b)(5)(A) and (B) of the ADA); Monette v.
Electronic Data Sys. Corp., 90 F.3d 1173, 1183 (6th Cir. 1996) (omitting 42 U.S.C.
§ 12112(b)(5)(B) in discussion of ADA failure to accommodate claims); Colo. Cross Disability
Coalition v. Hermanson Family Ltd. P'ship I, 264 F.3d 999, 1006 n.9 (10th Cir. 2001) (adopting
First Circuit's approach without mention of 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(B)).
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accommodate claims from disparate treatment claims2 1 but does not
distinguish subpart (A) claims from subpart (B) claims.20 2
For example, in Bultemeyer v. Fort Wayne Community Schools,2°3 the
plaintiff Bultemeyer worked as a custodian for the Fort Wayne
Community Schools (FWCS) for fifteen years.24 Bultemeyer began to
suffer from depression and schizophrenia and took a series of disability
leaves. 2 5 After a year's absence, his supervisor asked if he was ready to
return and told him that there was an opportunity at a high school.20 6 His
supervisor also told him that he would have to take a physical and stated
that, unlike his previous custodial job, no special accommodations would
be made.20 7 Bultemeyer was warned that failure to take the exam or show
up for work would result in termination. 28
After touring the school, Bultemeyer felt overwhelmed, so he declined
the job and refused to take the physical for fear he might pass it and have
to take the position.209 Subsequently, his supervisor fired him. 2 0 A few
hours after his firing, Bultemeyer gave his supervisor a note from his
psychiatrist, stating that he should work at a less stressful school.21'
Bultemeyer was not reinstated, so he sued FWCS for failure to
accommodate.212
The district court applied McDonnell Douglas and granted FWCS
summary judgment, holding that Bultemeyer neither established a prima
facie case of discrimination nor showed a timely request for
accommodation.213  The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that
Bultemeyer presented a failure to accommodate claim, not a disparate
treatment claim; thus the district court should not have applied
201. See, e.g., Lenker v. Methodist Hosp., 210 F.3d 792,799 (7th Cir. 2000).
202. See, e.g., Bultemeyer v. Fort Wayne Cnty. Sch., 100 F.3d 1281, 1283 (7th Cir. 1996). Cf.
supra note 200.
203. Bultemeyer, 100 F.3d at 1281.
204. Id. at 1281.
205. Id. at 1281-82.
206. Id. at 1282.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.
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McDonnell Douglas."4 The appellate court explained that the McDonnell
Douglas framework is inappropriate for failure to accommodate claims
such as Bultemeyer's arising under subparts (A) and (B) because they are
not disparate treatment claims.215
In its analysis, the Seventh Circuit distinguished failure to
accommodate claims from disparate treatment claims, pointing out that
Bultemeyer was not complaining that he was being treated differently or
less favorably than other FWCS employees.216 The court further stated
that failure to accommodate claims need no indirect evidence and should
be analyzed differently than disparate treatment claims.217 The Seventh
Circuit noted that FWCS was aware of Bultemeyer's disability and that
his past experience as a custodian for FWCS suggested that he was
qualified for the position at the high school, though he may have needed
some form of accommodation.218 The court the explained that but for
FWCS' unwillingness to engage in the interactive process, the record
might reflect that Bultemeyer needed a small adjustment in his duties to
enable him to take the position 9
The Seventh Circuit determined that FWCS appeared to have "taken
hasty advantage" of an opportunity to rid itself of a disabled employee
whom it was "tired of having to accommodate." The court concluded
that FWCS, because of its knowledge of and the severity of Bultemeyer's
mental illness, should have taken greater steps to find an
accommodation. In failing to do this, the court determined that FWCS
appeared to have acted in bad faith during the interactive process.222 On
these grounds, Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded the district court's
grant of summary judgment.'
214. Id. at 1283.
215. Id. at 1283-84.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 1284-85.
219. Id. at 1285.
220. Id. at 1286-87.
221. See id. at 1286.
222. Id. at 1287.
223. Id.
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IV. MCDONNELL DOUGLAS PRETEXT ANALYSIS SHOULD BE
APPLIED ONLY TO FAILURE TO ACCOMMODATE CLAIMS
ARISING UNDER §12112(B)(5)(B) OF THE ADA
Federal courts should apply the McDonnell Douglas framework only
to failure to accommodate claims arising under § 12112(b)(5)(B) of the
ADA. First, whereas the proscribed discrimination under subpart (A)
results from a failure to accommodate, the proscribed discrimination
under subpart (B) results in a failure to accommodate. This distinction
should serve as an aid to courts in distinguishing claims arising under
subpart (A) from those arising under subpart (B) and help focus the
analysis on the relevant issue, depending upon the type of claim. Second,
because an employer's intent is an issue under subpart (B), claims arising
under this section should be analyzed using the McDonnell Douglas
framework. Third, because failure to accommodate claims under subpart
(B) are analogous to disparate treatment discrimination, particularly with
regard to need and use of circumstantial evidence, courts should apply
the McDonnell Douglas framework to such claims.
A. Federal Courts Must Distinguish Failure to Accommodate Claims
Arising Under § 12112(b)(5)(A) from those Arising Under§ 12112(b)(S)(B)
When a plaintiff alleges failure to accommodate, a court must first
examine the facts to determine whether an existing or future duty to
accommodate has been violated. In making this determination, the court
must ask whether the alleged failure to accommodate preceded or
followed the adverse employment action that gave rise to the suit. If the
court finds that the adverse employment action followed the alleged
failure to accommodate, then an existing duty to accommodate has been
violated under subpart (A).22 If the court finds that the adverse
employment action preceded the alleged failure to accommodate, then a
future duty to accommodate has been violated under subpart (B).2' By
making this determination, the court will avoid potentially irrelevant
inquiries of intent, reasonableness, and undue hardship.
224. Supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
225. Supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
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For any ADA claim of discrimination to be actionable, the plaintiff
must have suffered some form of adverse employment action.226 The key
distinction between claims arising under, respectively, subpart (A) and
subpart (B) is whether the adverse employment action followed or
preceded the need for accommodation.227 Liability under subpart (A)
involves the breach of an existing duty to accommodate associated with
present employment conditions in which the failure to accommodate led
to adverse conditions or an adverse decision;2" thus the adverse action
follows a denied request for accommodation. 9 Conversely, under
subpart (B) the adverse employment action will necessarily precede-
actually cause-the failure to provide a reasonable accommodation."
For example, in the hypothetical," Jack alleges failure to
accommodate after being fired. Jack may suspect that DotCom
discriminated against him by denying him the privilege of participating
in company meetings when it refused his requests for an interpreter. Jack
may also suspect that DotCom fired him out of a desire to avoid having
to provide the sign-language interpreter as a condition of continued
employment. Whereas the former claim involves an existing duty to
accommodate as described in subpart (A), the duty to provide an
interpreter as a condition of future employment involves a future duty to
accommodate as described in subpart (B). 2 Jack's loss of the privilege
of participating in company meetings followed DotCom's denial of his
request for accommodation, so this adverse action may give rise to a
subpart (A) claim. In contrast, Jack's termination preceded DotCom's
duty to provide the interpreter for future meetings, so this adverse action
may give rise a subpart (B) claim.
This distinction is important with regard to the relevant issues raised
by each respective claim. To analyze Jack's first claim-his subpart (A)
claim-the court would ask only whether providing an interpreter was a
reasonable accommodation and whether it would have posed an undue
226. Supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text. See also Marshall v. Fed. Express Corp., 130
F.3d 1095, 1099 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (noting ADA requirement of an adverse employment action).
227. Supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
228. Supra note 65 and accompanying text.
229. See Marshall, 130 F.3d at 1099.
230. See id.
231. Supra note I and accompanying text.
232. Supra notes 57-61 and accompanying text; see also supra Part I.C.1.-2.
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hardship on DotCom.233 The court would not inquire into DotCom's
subjective reasons for the denial because subpart (A) imposes a sort of
strict liability for refusing such a request unless it is unreasonable or
unduly burdensome."
In contrast, DotCom's subjective intent is the central issue in Jack's
subpart (B) claim that DotCom terminated him in order to avoid having
to provide the interpreter as a condition of future employment. Because it
is possible that DotCom would have had to provide the interpreter as a
condition of Jack's future employment, the issue remains whether
DotCom fired Jack to avoid this duty.235 Issues of reasonableness and
undue hardship would only be relevant if DotCom had affirmatively
responded to Jack's claim, asserting the undue hardship defense. 6
However, in the hypothetical DotCom asserted that it fired Jack for
violating company policies; thus DotCom's intent is an issue.
In order to uphold the protections of the ADA, federal courts must
first determine whether the adverse employment action arose from an
existing duty to accommodate or preceded a future duty to accommodate.
Once this determination has been made, federal courts should select an
appropriate analytical tool for the disposition of the claims. By ignoring
the distinction between the two types of failure to accommodate claims,
courts run the risk of selecting an inappropriate framework, thereby
leading the analysis into potentially irrelevant inquiries of
reasonableness, undue hardship, and intent.
B. Federal Courts Should Apply the McDonnell Douglas Framework
Only to Claims Arising under § 12112(b)(5)(B) Because the
Employer's Intent is the Central Issue of Such Claims
Failure to accommodate claims arising under subpart (A) do not
involve the issue of employer's intent, so the McDonnell Douglas
framework is inapplicable to such claims. In contrast, intent is the critical
issue in claims arising under subpart (B). Because the McDonnell
Douglas framework is used to discern intent, federal courts should apply
the framework to claims arising under subpart (B).
233. Supra notes 174-77 and accompanying text.
234. Supra notes 65-79 and accompanying text.
235. Supra notes 80-93 and accompanying text.
236. Supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text.
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1. Intent is not an Issue in 42 U.S. C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) Claims, so the
McDonnell Douglas Framework is Inapplicable to such Claims
Subpart (A) protects present employment interests of disabled persons
by prohibiting employers from "not making reasonable
accommodations" unless the accommodations pose an undue hardship. 7
The duty to accommodate under subpart (A) exists once the employer is
aware that a disabled person suffers from limitations that affect the
terms, conditions, or privileges of his or her existing employment
opportunity." When an employer knowingly refuses to accommodate
existing disability-related limitations, the disabled person may suffer an
adverse employment action as a result. 9 In such a case, the disabled
person may allege failure to accommodate, and the only two relevant
issues are whether a reasonable accommodation was available and
whether such an accommodation would pose an undue hardship on the
employer.2' Thus, subpart (A) in effect imposes strict liability on the
employer with undue hardship as the only exception to the duty to
accommodate.24'
For instance, in the above hypothetical, Jack requested a sign-
language interpreter so that he could participate in company meetings. 242
Participation in the meetings could be considered a condition or privilege
associated with Jack's existing employment similar to the comfortable
work environment sought by the plaintiff in Higgins.243 Jack's request for
an interpreter is also similar to the plaintiffs request for a fan and the
moving of the loudspeaker in Higgins.244 In each case, the relevant issues
are whether the request was reasonable and whether the employer would
have suffered undue hardship in granting that request2 45
The problem with the analysis in Mole is that, in spite of both the fact
that Mole's MS precipitated her declining work performance and the fact
237. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2001). See also supra Part I.C.1.
238. Supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text.
239. Supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text.
240. Supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text. See also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe,
Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 264 (lst Cir. 1999) (explaining that accommodation is only needed because of a
disability, so any denial is discrimination because of a disability).
241. Higgins, 194 F.3d at 264.
242. Supra note 1 and accompanying text.
243. Supra notes 164-66 and accompanying text.
244. Supra notes 164-66 and accompanying text.
245. See supra notes 44-56 and accompanying text.
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that her employer was aware of her disability-related difficulties, the
court applied McDonnell Douglas and focused its inquiry on her
employer's intent.246 Mole's employer stated she was fired for her poor
job performance, and the record clearly supported this contention.247
Nevertheless, this analysis leads to precisely the sort of circularity-and
result-that the ADA prohibits: a disabled person is terminated for
failing to fulfill job requirements that she could only fulfill with a
reasonable accommodation. Thus, the adverse employment action-
discharge-resulted from the failure to accommodate, triggering the
protection afforded by subpart (A).
Under subpart (A) the issue of whether an accommodation is
reasonable depends on a variety of factors. These factors include whether
the employee suffered from a qualifying disability; whether the disability
resulted in limitations; whether the limitations affected the terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment; whether the employer was
aware of these limitations; and whether the requested accommodation
would effectively address the limitations.24 None of these factors
involves the employer's intent; they are objective questions best
addressed through the introduction of direct evidence. 9
Similarly, the issue of whether reasonable accommodation would pose
an undue hardship is also best resolved through the introduction of direct,
objective evidence." This issue involves factors such as the size, type,
and resources of a business as well as a cost-benefit analysis of the effect
of the proposed accommodation. 1 Again, the requisite direct evidence
addresses objective issues and not the subjective issue of the employer's
intent. 2 Thus, employer's intent, the central issue of a McDonnell
Douglas analysis, is not an issue in subpart (A) claims; therefore federal
courts should not apply the McDonnell Douglas framework to such
claims. 3
246. Supra notes 152-55 and accompanying text.
247. Supra note 155 and accompanying text.
248. Supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text.
249. See Monette v. Electronic Data Sys. Corp., 90 F.3d 1173, 1183 (6th Cir. 1996).
250. Id.
251. Supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text.
252. See Monette, 90 F.3d at 1183; Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252,
264 (1st Cir. 1999).
253. Supra notes 171-74 and accompanying text.
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2. Intent is the Central Issue in 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(B) Claims, so
Federal Courts Should Apply the McDonnell Douglas Framework
to such Claims
Subpart (B) of the ADA also protects employment opportunities for
disabled persons by placing a duty on employers to provide reasonable
accommodationsY 4 In contrast to the existing duty to provide reasonable
accommodations established in subpart (A), subpart 03) places a duty on
employers to not deny employment opportunities to disabled persons
because of the need to make reasonable accommodation."5 The denial of
an employment opportunity does not automatically give rise to liability
under this section; rather liability arises only when the denial is
motivated by the employer's desire to avoid making accommodations. 6
If the employer's intent is known, then the McDonnell Douglas
framework is unnecessary.' However, when an employer's intent is
unknown or in dispute, federal courts should then apply the McDonnell
Douglas framework because it is the appropriate analytical tool for
resolving the issue of intent. 58
Using the above hypothetical as an illustration,2 9 Jack may suspect
that DotCom took advantage of an opportunity to fire him to avoid
having to provide him an interpreter as a condition of future
employment. DotCom asserted that it fired Jack for violation of company
policies, and the adverse employment action-discharge-preceded
Jack's future need for an interpreter. Because this claim involves a future
duty to accommodate, it arises under subpart (B). Thus, DotCom's intent
is the central issue.
If the court were to apply the analysis used in, for example, Higgins to
Jack's failure to accommodate claim, the court would ask only whether
providing an interpreter was a reasonable accommodation and whether it
would pose an undue hardship. While such an analysis may be
appropriate for Jack's subpart (A) claim that DotCom's denial of his
request adversely affected the conditions of his employment,261 it makes
254. Supra notes 80-83 and accompanying text.
255. Supra notes 80-83 and accompanying text.
256. Supra note 80 and accompanying text.
257. Cf. supra note 110 and accompanying text (explaining purpose of framework is to resolve
issue of intent when direct evidence is lacking).
258. Supra notes 195-96and accompanying text.
259. Supra note 1 and accompanying text.
260. Supra notes 65-79 and accompanying text.
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little sense for the court to apply the same analysis to Jack's subpart (B)
claim that DotCom terminated him in order to avoid having to provide
the interpreter.
Following the analysis in Higgins, a court may find DotCom liable
under subpart (B) without establishing DotCom's intent to fire Jack to
avoid its duty because the requested accommodation was both reasonable
and not unduly burdensome. This is precisely what the Seventh Circuit
did in Bultemeyer. the court looked at issues of reasonableness but
nevertheless concluded that the defendant was liable based on inferences
it drew regarding the employer's intent.26'
In Bultemeyer, the plaintiff requested an accommodation as a
condition of accepting an employment opportunity.2 2 The employer
discharged the plaintiff prior, asserting that employee failed to show up
for his required physical or to his first day of work.263 In spite of the
Seventh Circuit's observations that it appeared that the employer fired
the plaintiff to avoid accommodating him-a phrase nearly identical to
the language found in subpart (B)-the Seventh Circuit made no formal
inquiry into the employer's intent.2' Rather, the court speculated at the
reasonableness of accommodating the plaintiff, ultimately concluding
that the employer had acted in bad faith.26' This inconsistency could be
avoided if the court follows Marshall and begins with the issue of
DotCom's intent before reaching the issues of reasonableness and
hardship. 6
As explained above, an employer's intent is the central issue of a
claim arising under subpart (B). 267 An employer may be silent as to its
motive or offer another non-discriminatory reason for denying an
opportunity, leaving the employee with little more than evidence of a
prima facie case of discrimination under subpart (B). 268 Because the
prima facie case does not prove the employer's subjective intent was to
avoid making an accommodation, 269 an employee must also rely on
261. Supra notes 217-23 and accompanying text.
262. Supra notes 205-07 and accompanying text.
263. Supra notes 208-10 and accompanying text.
264. Supra notes 220-22 and accompanying text.
265. Supra notes 220-22 and accompanying text.
266. Supra notes 194-98 and accompanying text.
267. Supra notes 80-83 and accompanying text.
268. Supra note 87 and accompanying text.
269. Supra notes 127-29 and accompanying text.
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indirect, circumstantial evidence such as evidence of pretext that infers
the employer's intent.270
Without a means of inferring intent through evidence of pretext, an
employee like Jack must rely on the employer's proffered reason for its
motive." Because it is unlikely that an employer will admit that it
intended to avoid its duty to accommodate, it is unlikely that an
employer will be held liable for denying the opportunity without
circumstantial evidence.272 The McDonnell Douglas framework is
designed to permit a plaintiff to prove indirectly what cannot be proved
directly by introducing evidence of pretext,273 and the framework is
readily adapted to the elements of a subpart (B) failure to accommodate
claim.274 Thus, federal courts should apply McDonnell Douglas to claims
arising under subpart (3) when the central issue of intent is disputed.
B. Unlike Failure to Accommodate Claims Under § 12112(b)(5)(A),
Claims Under § 12112(b)(5)(B) are Analogous to Disparate
Treatment Claims, so Federal Courts Should Apply the McDonnell
Douglas Framework to such Claims
Whereas failure to accommodate claims under subpart (A) are
analogous to ADA disparate impact claims, failure to accommodate
claims under subpart (B) are analogous to ADA disparate treatment
claims. Under subpart (A), failure to accommodate claims do not require
a showing of discriminatory intent, and the undue hardship defense
requires direct, objective evidence similar to evidence required for the
business necessity defense used in disparate impact claims. In contrast,
failure to accommodate claims under subpart (B), like disparate
treatment claims, hinge on the issue of the employer's intent and may
require inferential evidence when direct evidence is unavailable. Thus,
while the McDonnell Douglas framework is not appropriate for claims
arising under subpart (A), the McDonnell Douglas framework is the
appropriate analytical tool for claims arising under subpart (B).
270. Supra notes 127-29 and accompanying text.
271. Supra notes 122-23 and accompanying text.
272. Supra notes 118-20 and accompanying text.
273. Supra notes 118-20 and accompanying text.
274. Supra notes 185-98 and accompanying text.
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1. Failure to Accommodate Claims Under § 12112(b)(5)(A) are
Analogous to Disparate Impact Claims, Making the McDonnell
Douglas Framework Inapplicable
Failure to accommodate claims under subpart (A) are analogous to
ADA disparate impact claims. 75 Like disparate impact claims, subpart
(A) failure to accommodate claims do not require a showing of
discriminatory intent and are best resolved with direct, objective
evidence.276 Thus, the McDonnell Douglas framework is inapplicable to
subpart (A) failure to accommodate claims.
Disparate impact disability discrimination involves facially neutral
employment policies and procedures that inadvertently limit employment
opportunities for disabled persons.277 For example, in the above
hypothetical, 278 if DotCom were to adopt a policy requiring all
employees to participate in the monthly meetings, then hearing-impaired
employees like Jack might be impacted differently than non-hearing
impaired employees because without an interpreter, participation might
be impossible. DotCom's reason for requiring participation would be
irrelevant because the policy discriminates by disparately impacting the
hearing-impaired whether DotCom intends it to or not.279 Thus, like
disparate impact claims, subpart (A) failure to accommodate claims
involve a type of strict liability that arises regardless of the employer's
intent.280 The McDonnell Douglas framework is designed to resolve the
issue of an employer's intent.281 Because there is no need for evidence
pertaining to the employer's intent, the McDonnell Douglas framework
is inapplicable to subpart (A) failure to accommodate claims.
Also, like disparate impact claims, subpart (A) failure to
accommodate claims are best resolved with direct, objective evidence.2 2
An employer's only defense to a disparate impact claim is to show the
275. See Monette v. Electronic Data Sys. Corp., 90 F.3d 1173, 1179 (6th Cir. 1996) (noting Title
VII disparate impact claims are analogous to § 12112(b)(5)(A) claims and ADA disparate impact
claims).
276. Supra notes 26-36 and accompanying text.
277. Supra notes 26-36 and accompanying text.
278. Supra note 1 and accompanying text.
279. Supra notes 31-36 and accompanying text.
280. Supra notes 31-36 and accompanying text.
281. Supra notes 103-19 and accompanying text.
282. Supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text.
Vol. 77:913, 2002
Analyzing Failure to Accommodate Claims
challenged policy or standard exists out of business necessity.213
Likewise an employer's only defense to a subpart (A) failure to
accommodate claim is to show that the accommodation would create an
undue hardship.' s In contrast, the McDonnell Douglas framework is
designed to resolve the issue of intent through inferential evidence. 8 5
Due to the direct, objective nature of the evidence required for each
respective defense, the McDonnell Douglas framework is inappropriate
for the resolution of the main issues in disparate impact and subpart (A)
failure to accommodate claims.
2. Failure to Accommodate Claims Under §12112(b)(5)(B) are
Analogous to Disparate Treatment Claims, Making the McDonnell
Douglas Framework Applicable
In contrast, failure to accommodate claims under subpart (B) are
analogous to ADA disparate treatment claims. Like disparate treatment
discrimination, failure to accommodate claims under subpart (B) involve
differential treatment of disabled persons because of their disabilities.86
Also, like disparate treatment claims, failure to accommodate claims
under subpart (B) hinge on the issue of the employer's intent. Such
claims may require indirect, inferential evidence, particularly evidence of
pretext.28
First, ADA disparate treatment claims and failure to accommodate
claims under subpart (B) are similar because they both involve
differential treatment of disabled employees. Disparate treatment under
the ADA includes adverse employment actions such as discharge, refusal
to hire, and refusal to promote.288 If an employer takes such an action
because of an employee's disability, then the employer has discriminated
in violation of the ADA.8 9
Similarly, a disabled employee who is denied an employment
opportunity because of the need for accommodation has been treated
283. Supra note 31 and accompanying text; cf. Monette v. ElectronicElec. Data Sys. Corp., 90
F.3d 1173, 1179 (6th Cir. 1996).
284. Supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
285. Supra notes 103-24 and accompanying text.
286. Supra note 28 and accompanying text.
287. Supra notes 28, 79-82 and accompanying text.
288. Supra note 28 and accompanying text.
289. Supra note 25 and accompanying text.
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differently than a non-disabled employee who has no need for
accommodation. 290 This differential treatment is due to the disability;
without the disability, the accommodation would not be necessary.29'
Thus, in denying an opportunity that potentially requires
accommodation, the employer is effectively denying the opportunity on
the basis of an employee's disability.292
Second, plaintiffs bringing either disparate treatment or failure to
accommodate claims under subpart (B) face a similar challenge in
proving discriminatory intent. 93  When a plaintiff succeeds in
establishing a prima facie case of disparate treatment discrimination, and
the employer successfully rebuts the presumption of discrimination, the
plaintiff must present evidence indicating that the employer's reason is a
pretext for discrimination.294
For example, in the above hypothetical,295 DotCom claims that it fired
Jack for violation of company policies. Jack may suspect that DotCom
fired him either because he is deaf or to avoid having to accommodate
him by providing a sign-language interpreter as a condition of future
employment. While Jack might be able to adduce evidence of a prima
facie case of both types of discrimination,296 he must also show that
DotCom's proffered reason is pretext for an illicit motive-disability
prejudice or a desire to avoid providing an accommodation.297 Evidence
that non-disabled employees who similarly violated DotCom's policies
were not fired as well as evidence that DotCom denied opportunities to
other disabled employees who potentially needed accommodations might
suggest DotCom's proffered reason is false. Consequently, such evidence
might show DotCom's reason is pretext for illicit discrimination.298
Without evidence of pretext or the opportunity to present it, disparate
treatment claims and subpart (B) failure to accommodate claims such as
290. See, e.g., Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 264 (1st Cir. 1999)
(explaining that any failure to accommodate is always because of a disability).
291. See id.
292. See id.
293. See, e.g., Marshall v. Fed. Express Corp., 130 F.3d 1095, 1099-1100 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
294. Supra notes 110-23 and accompanying text.
295. Supra note 1 and accompanying text.
296. Supra notes 87 and 135 and accompanying text.
297. Supra notes 80-83 and accompanying text.
298. Supra note 116 and accompanying text
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Jack's will fail as a matter of law. 99 The McDonnell Douglas framework
was designed to permit plaintiffs alleging disparate treatment to show
discriminatory intent through circumstantial evidence."' Because subpart
(B) claims, like disparate treatment claims, require proof of intent, which
may require inferential evidence, federal courts should apply the
McDonnell Douglas framework to failure to accommodate claims arising
under § 12112(b)(5)(B) of the ADA.
V. CONCLUSION
The two subparts of § 12112(b)(5) of the ADA establish two distinct
duties to accommodate. Subpart (A) establishes a duty on employers to
make accommodations to disability-based limitations associated with the
conditions of an existing employment opportunity. In contrast, subpart
(B) establishes a duty on employers not to deny future employment
opportunities because such opportunities might require the employer to
accommodate disabled employees. Violation of either section gives rise
to a claim for failure to accommodate.
In addressing failure to accommodate claims, most federal courts
either uniformly adopt or reject the McDonnell Douglas analytical
framework without recognizing the distinction between the two types of
claims. The uniform adoption or rejection of the framework for failure to
accommodate claims leads courts into irrelevant inquiries of intent,
reasonableness, and undue hardship, depending upon whether it is a
subpart (A) or subpart (3) claim.
To address failure to accommodate claims properly, courts must first
determine whether an existing duty or future duty to accommodate has
been violated. Unlike claims arising under subpart (A), claims under
subpart (B) involve a future duty to accommodate and require evidence
of an employer's intent. Direct evidence of intent is difficult to establish;
however, the McDonnell Douglas framework is designed to discern
intent through inferential evidence. By permitting a plaintiff to infer
intent through inferential evidence, particularly evidence of pretext, the
McDonnell Douglas framework facilitates the analysis of claims arising
under § 12112(b)(5)(B) of the ADA.
299. Supra note 118 and accompanying text.
300. Supra note 110 and accompanying text.
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